EXECUTIVE RISK ASSESSMENT SUMMARY

DATE: 12/95
REV. DATE:
LRU NUMBER: SED39126815
1. SEVERITY: Catastrophic
2. LIKELIHOOD OF OCCURRENCE: Improbable
3. CLASSIFICATION: Commiled
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
A - Pass .
B - Pass
C - Pass
Cause: Excessive wear, piece-part defect, structurally inadequate for worst case loads
Failure detection:
Crew notices the seat-back fail to latch,
REMAINING PATHS:
1. Qty (2) Spring loaded latching pins
aint for nominal flight loads or crash loads. Possible crew turbulence, landing or following a failure which results in a

- Linkages are decoupled to allow engagement of one latching pin if the other is jammed (LWS-MS has positive margins of safety for one latch out on nominal landing).
- 2. The loads to the pin that might be imposed during operational use are considered low, thus the pin retains high margins.

VERIFICATION:

- 1a. A laich/unlatch test performed (150 iterations), No failures encountered,
- 1b. PDA 4.2.3, PIA 4.2.3 With the scat-back in the aft position and occupant in place, pull control cable, slowly move seat back forward and release the control cable lever. The seat back shall lock in place. Repeat for aft position, Without occupant repeat previous steps using "T"-bar. With scat back in forward position, pull "T"-bar move scat back forward into folded position. Release stowage pins and return to forward position. During all phases "T"-bar should be easily released and the scat back shall be free of jams, bindings, or inadvertent stops and move smoothly.
- 1c. OMRS V66AAO.052-A, 053-A, 054-A, 055-A, 056-A Verify two position scat back, full range and locking capability.
- 1d. Life Certification Test completed on seat-back (800 full range of motion iterations) (TPS DW9520143O) and passed.
- An analysis has been done verifying the structural integrity on the center pin.
 See Attached Analysis